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Foucault's Hobbes and the Concept of Liberty 
DUNCAN IVISON 
I 
After more than 350 years, Hobbes remains a vital political philosopher. 
Indeed, in more ways than one, we live in Hobbesian times. I want to 
explore one dimension of his influence, namely, the extension of his 
conception of political liberty into recent political thought. 
One of the fundamental questions in political philosophy is, 
surely: what does it mean to be free? And one of the fundamental 
questions we are asking today is: what is the price of freedom? In the 
midst of a complex struggle against transnational terrorism, many 
people argue that the value of freedom needs to be balanced against 
that of security. Or, more precisely, that security is a pre-condition of 
liberty, and since we live in extreme times new adjustments need to 
be made between these two values. I disagree with many proposed 
adjustments in recent debates over anti-terrorism laws, but my aim 
here is not to make that case in fult but to explore the concept of liberty 
in more detail. More specifically, I want to analyze three distinctive 
views about political liberty, each of which bears an interesting 
relationship to Hobbes. 
If political philosophy has a distinctive role to play in the broader 
public culture - and I believe passionately that it does - then what it 
can offer is not so much specific answers to complex policy questions, 
but rather as clear an articulation as possible of the conceptuat 
historical and normative resources for framing and thinking about 
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the problems we face. In what follows, I explore three views about 
political liberty: (1) the distinction made famous by Isaiah Berlin 
between 'negative' and 'positive' liberty; (2) the republican conception 
of 'freedom as non-domination' (developed by Quentin Skinner 
and Philip Pettit); and (3) the conception of liberty understood as 
a 'practice' developed by Michel Foucault. Hobbes is central to all 
three, albeit in each case for very different reasons, One question T am 
asking (although not necessarily answering) is whether we are dealing 
with three different concepts of liberty here, or rather with a host of 
conceptions branching out from a single core. The other question, 
much broader and even more contestable, is to ask which concept 
(or conception) offers the greatest critical resource for thinking about 
liberty today. My sympathies lie with some variation of (2) and (3), 
but I can offer only the barest outline of that argument here. 
II 
For Jean-Jacques Rousseau, freedom is always to be contrasted 
with dependence, and especially with dependence on the will of 
another. There is a big difference, on Rousseau's account, between 
my being confined inside my house due to a snowstorm and the case 
in which my neighbours lock me in.l Although the objective degree 
of constraint is similar in each case - I am constrained from exiting 
my house - my reaction to the second will be very different from 
the first, or so Rousseau suggests. In the case of being locked in by 
my neighbours, I might well feel anger or resentment towards their 
actions (or inaction, if others had the ability to free me but ignored 
my calls for help). In the first case, Rousseau suggests, feelings 
of resentment, at least, would be out of place. Subjugation to the 
impersonal forces of nature is different from being locked in by my 
neighbours. But what exactly is different? One thing is that when we 
react to someone by resenting him we are holding him responsible in 
some way.2 It doesn't make sense to resent the weather, or my dog, as 
much as both may let me down, or indeed confine me to my house. 
And whatever the truth of determinism, whatever the truth of the 
increasingly powerful naturalistic picture of human behaviour and 
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psychology, our social and political practices are shot through with 
such 'reactive altilude~'.' 
Liberty as a political value is clearly linked to the presence of 
coercion and constraint, but the precise nature of this relation is 
complex. Is there a primitive, non-moralized conception of freedom 
that lies at the base of our more elaborate conceptions of political 
liberty?') A number of years ago, Charles Taylor introduced an 
interesting example to test this thought, which has become familiar 
in the literature. 5 Consider the situation of citizens living in two 
different places (for Taylor it was London and Albania c.1979). In one 
there is freedom of religion, association and expression, but also lots 
of rules and norms that restrict our actions in many ways - traffic 
lights, road rules, tax laws, etc. In the other, there isn't much freedom 
of religion or expression, but there aren't many traffic lights, tax laws 
or other regulations either. It might well be, Taylor suggested, that 
if we literally added up all the 'free acts' available to us in the first 
and compared them with the second, we would be 'freer' overall in 
the second. That is, if by 'freer overall' we mean the total number of 
'free actions' available to each citizen. But, Taylor suggested, this is 
preposterous; freedom of religion and expression just mean more to 
us and are objectively more valuable (given the kind of agents we are) 
than the freedom to drive unconstrained by traffic rules or to be free 
of many other social and legal obligations. It follows, therefore, that 
whenever we compare freedoms we cannot help but make evaluative 
judgments about which freedoms are more meaningful or valuable 
to us. The freedom to forgo wearing a tie to work on Fridays is not 
the same as the freedom to wear a turban in accordance with your 
faith. 
The upshot for Taylor was that there is no neutral or bare account 
of 'free acts' lurking beneath the surface upon which these evaluative 
judgments can be built. At the very least, so this argument goes, it is 
just too difficult to individuate, weigh and compare all the possible 
'free acts' open to individuals at anyone point in time in such a way 
so as to give us an empirical measure of freedom.6 
Still, is there at least a more or less basic concept we can work 
with, however unavoidably inflected by these kinds of judgments? 
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Locke defined liberty as 'a power to do or not to do; to do or forbear 
doing as we will'? This gives us a connection between freedom and 
capacity; but capacity in relation to what? We do not have a complaint 
in freedom in the political sense merely when our primitive freedom 
is violated. The presence of the state, or any kind of formal political 
order, necessarily violates our primitive freedom in some way. So the 
extension uf freedum as a political value requires saying more about 
the nature of cuercion involved and how it blocks or affects one's 
freedom in a much richer sense. I only have a claim in liberty if I am 
able to make a case beyond the terms of primitive freedom.s 
We are not unfree if we are constrained from doing what we 
fundamentally lack the capacity to do. This gives us a difference 
between freedom and power. Hobbes gave the example of two men 
trapped in a room. One has the power or capacity to leave, but is 
restrained by 'walls, or chains'; the other is 'fastened to his bed by 
sickness' and hence lacks the ability to leave. According to Hobbes, 
the first is unfree, the second is neither free nor unfree, he is simply 
unable (as opposed to being rendered unfree by being blocked from 
exercising an ability he possesses).Y The link between freedom and 
capacity, and, more importantly, to obstacles to the exercise of our 
capacities as we desire to exercise them with humanly imposed 
coercion or interference (which I noted above), is here present. 
Hobbes also argued that liberty, properly understood, involves 
the 'absence of opposition', and by 'opposition' Hobbes meant what 
he called 'external impediments of motion' - physical constraints 
on our freedom.lO His immediate analogy was to water, but it was 
intended to apply to human bodies as well: 'For whatsoever is tied, 
or environed, as it cannot move but within a certain space, which 
space is determined by the opposition of some external body, we say 
it hath not liberty to go further'.ll Since for Hobbes, the rational will is 
necessarily a determined will (the will is simply the 'last appetite or 
aversion' in a process of deliberation), it makes no sense to talk about 
either the passions or sense impressions as constraints (including the 
passion of fear: fear can shape our will but does not constrain our 
liberty, in the proper sense of the term).12 
So liberty consists in the absence of physical constraint on natural 
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motion. The sailors who are forced to throw their goods overboard 
in a storm are no less free then someone who decides to walk to the 
shops to buy some milk. But there is a difference between our natural 
liberty and the 'liberty of subjects', that is, the freedom we enjoy 
once subject to sovereign power. On the one hand we clearly lack 
the liberty we enjoyed as natural bodies. However, although political 
obligation clearly binds and constrains our action in many ways, 
the freedom that is left over to political subjects - certain inalienable 
natural rights, as well as freedom of action in relation to domains in 
which the sovereign has passed no law - is still considerable. 13 In this 
sense, at least, subjects of a monarchy enjoy as much liberty as those 
who live in a popular commonwealth or republic. 1-1 
In his now classic 'Two Concepts of Liberty', Isaiah Berlin referred 
first to what he called a negative concept of liberty. Citing both Hobbes 
and Helvetius, he summarized it as 'the area within which a man 
can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from 
doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree .... The 
criterion of oppression is the part that I believe to be played by other 
human beings, directly or indirectly, with or without the intention 
of doing so, in frustrating my wishes'. IS Although Berlin goes on to 
argue that this concept is the most appropriate as an ideal of freedom 
for modern liberal societies, other philosophers have wanted to go 
one step further. In another important paper, 'Negative and Positive 
Freedom' (published in 1967), Gerald MacCallum argued that all 
intelligible claims about freedom can be subsumed under a formula 
that includes the absence of constraint.16 One of the main points of 
Berlin's lecture was to distinguish between two families of concepts 
of liberty. MacCallum rejects this, arguing that freedom is essentially 
a triadic relation: Freedom always necessarily refers to an agent (x), 
to the constraint, interference or obstacle (y), and to the goal or end 
(z). Whenever you talk about freedom you are talking about an agent 
being free from something, to do or be something (or not to do or be 
something): one concept, many possible conceptions. 
However, as I mentioned, one of the main purposes of Berlin's 
lecture is to distinguish between two concepts of liberty. Of course, 
the idea that there are rival and even incommensurable ideals of 
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liberty is older than Berlin's lecture. The most obvious antecedent 
(which Berlin acknowledges) i" Benjamin Constant's speech to the 
Athenee Royale in 1819, 'The Liberty of the Ancients compared with 
that of the Moderns'Y In that lecture, Constant sought to portray the 
ancient Greek ideal of citizenship based on civic virtue and direct 
participation in politics as ill-suited to modern commercial societies. 
Berlin too has problems "vith modern appeals to this ancient ideal. 
But he accepts that there are indeed two different ideals of liberty 
at stake, as opposed to MacCallum's suggestion that to speak of 
anything other than freedom involving the absence of constraint 
is a mistake. But then what is this second concept of liberty? Berlin 
gives us a number of different accounts. He starts off by associating 
it with the wish 'on the part of the individual to be his own master', 
as opposed to being acted on by external forces; to be 'moved by 
reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes 
which affect me, as it were, from outside'.lR But as critics have pointed 
out, this is entirely consistent with the negative conception and so 
can't stand as an example of a separate concept of liberty. He then 
moves to the idea of self-realization, initially in terms of removing 
those internal obstacles that may obstruct acting autonomously; but 
once again this seems compatible with the negative conception. It is 
only when he identifies freedom as self-realization with the realization 
of true self, or real self, that he identifies, potentially, a distinctive 
concept of liberty.l9 Here freedom, arguably, cannot be subsumed to 
MacCallum's triadic structure, since it is not to speak of a condition 
in which someone is free in the absence of constraint but rather as 
free in a 'pattern of action of a certain kind'.2D 
In fact, it is not clear that the distinction between negative and 
positive freedom really does denote two distinct concepts of liberty?l 
Instead, what we have are differences about the nature of constraint. 
Recall that, for Hobbes, only physical impediments count as relevant 
forms of constraint when clarifying the meaning of the concept of 
liberty. For other theorists, however, including many of those often 
allied with 'positive liberty', there is a much broader set of possible 
constraints. Even for the theorist (such as T. H. Green or indeed Hegel) 
who says I am free only in realizing my genuinely rational self, or 
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in acting in a particularly self-conscious - albeit socially mediated 
- way, it mu~t be the case that all those things that might interfere 
with me so acting count as constraints. To say that freedom is self-
realization really means to say either that people, if free, will realize 
themselves; or, that if people realize themselves, they will be free. 22 
This means we need to say something about what gets in the way of 
people realizing themselves, as well as what self-realization actually 
consists in. For Hobbes, to be free means, in the strictest sense of the 
term, not to be physically constrained; what your actions amount to 
in terms of the overall pattern or quality of your choices or actions 
is of no ultimate concern. For someone like Hegel or Green, on the 
other hand, to be free involves a certain form of self-understanding 
or self-consciousness, achieved in part by living in the right kind 
of social and political order. Freedom is 'achieved' or realized with 
regard to a certain pattern of action or state of being. Anything that 
gets in the way of that achievement counts as a constraint, including 
non-physical or 'internal' constraints (for example, the absence of 
structures of mutual recognition). 
Berlin was particularly concerned with the problems he associates 
with positive liberty. On the one hand, he is worried about conceptual 
inflation: if liberty is assimilable to just about everything that is 
politically desirable it loses its conceptual usefulness. But a greater 
danger, he argues, is that a claim about the rational self-direction or 
self-realization of man's inner life could be translated into a claim 
about societies as a whole, and thus a thesis about individual freedom 
transformed into a doctrine of authority and oppression. Rousseau's 
notion of individuals being 'forced to be free' is, for Berlin, a locus 
classicus of this kind of confusionY Writing in the midst of the Cold 
War, and not so long after the end of the World War II and the struggle 
against fascism, Berlin was concerned to point out the risks that such 
metaphysical claims posed when translated into political ideals. 
Even though writers such as Green (who along with Kant, Fichte and 
Bosanquet loom large in the background of Berlin's critique) were 
speaking above all about the self-realization of individuals, and held 
that state action was only justified where it could be shown to increase 
the likelihood of individual self-development, Berlin remained 
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sceptical. The danger for him seemed inherent to the concept. 
We arrive now at a large and ongoing debate over whether or not 
Berlin has indeed identified something intrinsically dangerous about 
positive liberty.24 And it is not clear that he has. There are clearly less 
organicist and more comprehensive conceptions of the self-realization 
or 'state' approaches to liberty that might block the worries Berlin 
expressed. First of all, as I mentioned earlier in relation to Green, the 
fact that my extant desires can clash with what I ought to do according 
to my rational self doesn't necessarily mean that someone else can 
legitimately coerce me into so acting.25 We can readily say that the 
heroin addict would be freer if free of his addiction, without thereby 
endorsing coercive measures to bring about that state of affairs. 
Another example that Berlin mentions but doesn't fully explore is 
the idea of freedom as autonomy. Autonomy is a complex idea, but for 
argument's sake let us assume it means something like the capacity 
to set myself rational goals, or to give myself coherent principles of 
action that I can endorse in some way. Now much can be packed into 
the idea of the 'rational', but need not be. There are any number of 
different things it might be rational for me to do, some of which might 
well involve acting against what morality, social norms or the state, for 
that matter, might demand. Rationality need not entail monism about 
ends, but rather pluralism. Still, we might want to say that autonomy 
means acting according to those desires with which, after reflection, 
I can identify. In a well-known article, Harry Frankfurt argued for 
a distinction between first and second order desires (and thus first 
and second order volitions)?' Second-order desires are desires about 
my first order desires. So, for example, my (first order) desire to flee a 
seminar in order to get some dinner might conflict with my (second-
order) desire not to be moved so easily by my bodily desires when 
it comes to my education. One way to make sense of this conflict 
is to reflect on my desires; that is, whether I will that these are the 
desires that should move me to act. If I end up acting on a desire that 
I discover is in conflict with these second-order desires - I bolt for the 
door and dinner - then my action, suggests Frankfurt, is one I might 
not endorse. The basic idea is that if I cannot identify with or come to 
'own' that action (or set of actions), then I have not acted freelyY 
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What is the political upshot? A state concerned to promote 
autonomy - a liberal state, fur example - might be justified in coercing 
us to act 'rationally' only in the very limited sense of promoting the 
right kind of second-order reflection, for example, by forcing us to 
stay in school until we are sixteen, to vote, or to be immunized against 
certain diseases. An analogy: 'positive' freedom in this sense may 
be no more menacing than the rules of grammar are for speakers 
of a language. These rules do indeed constrain our use of words 
and sentences, but they also promote intelligibility and remarkable 
semantic creativity. 
This seems to land us back in Rousseau's paradoxical argument 
that people can be forced to be free. In fact, at this point Quentin 
Skinner and Philip Pettit insist there is another conception of liberty 
to hand. If one strand of positive freedom involves freedom as self-
realization through politics (Rousseau), and another strand of negative 
freedom involves freedom from external interference (Hobbes), then 
this third conception of freedom involves a distinctive assemblage 
of these strands. Pettit refers to it as the republican conception of 
negative liberty (Skinner prefers the more historically sensitive 
'neo-Roman' conception of liberty). The basic idea lying behind this 
conception is that freedom can be restricted by dependence, an idea 
we encountered above with Rousseau. In keeping with our earlier 
analysis, dependence then enters the frame as a relevant candidate, 
as a form of constraint that must be overcome in order to be free. 
Physical interference is thus not the only kind of constraint relevant 
for a theory of political liberty, since my dependence on others may 
cause me to shape my behaviour in ways to gain their favour or 
avoid their wrath. The key claim that Pettit and Skinner make is that 
the mere presence of arbitrary power has the effect of undermining 
political liberty; it shapes the range of options open to us, as well as 
those we feel capable of acting on. Put in its strongest terms, the mere 
presence of arbitrary power within a civil association has the effect 
of rendering its citizens slaves. To live under the arbitrary power of 
another is to live in such a way that one is dependent on another not 
choosing to interfere with you, or to exercise control over you, even 
though they could if they wanted to. This is to lack the ability to act 
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according to your own will (to act or forbear from acting), and to be 
subject to that of another. There are two dimensions here. Living under 
arbitrary rule means living in a condition where one cannot easily 
predict what the rules will be and how they will affect you. But it also 
means being especially vulnerable to those able to control those rules. 
Even if the master acts according to a clearly defined set of rules that 
the slave can see and thus plan for, the slave is still at the mercy of his 
master. In fact, living even under arbitrary liberal government2s- a 
government that does not interfere very often in one's life, but could 
if it wanted to without being subject to the discipline of the rule of 
law - renders one unfree. 
Whereas defenders of negative freedom argue that any interference 
entails a loss of liberty, the republican argues that only arbitrary 
interference counts as a loss of liberty, and arbitrary here means 
roughly interference that is capricious and that does not track the 
avowable interests of the agent affected by it. The political upshot is 
that negative liberty lacks resilience in the absence of some form of 
self-government, or 'contestatory democracy' as Pettit has put it. 2Y 
Political liberty is therefore not incompatible with upholding public 
duties. Why? Not because one realizes one's true self in cultivating the 
civic virtue required to do so, but because in upholding public duties 
one blocks the imposition of significant constraints upon one's actions; 
i.e. the potentially arbitrary actions of others.3D Moreover, those 
interferences required to secure the conditions of non-domination 
- for example, regulatory powers or laws needed to block powerful 
political actors from being able to interfere with one with impunity 
- don't in themselves constitute a cost in liberty. I shall return to this 
point below. 
So, are there really two - or even three - different concepts of 
liberty at play here? If there are, then the difference is not best captured 
in terms of Berlin's notion of negative versus positive liberty. Recall 
MacCallum's triadic structure: freedom is always of something (an 
agent or agents), from something, to do (not do) or become (or not 
become) something. And recall my initial discussion of the link 
between a primitive conception of liberty and the presence of coercion 
and constraint. All claims about freedom seem to involve the absence 
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of constraint in some way; it is hard to find any account of freedom 
in which that element is completely absent. But, having said that, the 
differences between the nature of those constraints (internal, external; 
wide, narrow) and especially the nature of the persons or agents to 
whom the description applies, and the ends to which they are or 
should be oriented, are indeed often profound. If there are different 
concepb of liberty then surely the differences are to be found there 
- to do with the nature of constraints and conceptions of the person 
- as opposed to claims about negativity or positivity. 
III 
I began by suggesting that freedom as a political value bears a close 
relation to coercion. The republican conception of freedom as non-
domination preserves the link with coercion, but disconnects coercion 
from any necessary link to external interference. I can be constrained 
even when not physically interfered with. But the republican goes 
a step further in claiming that interference per se does not diminish 
freedom. There is no cost in liberty, it seems, if I am obliged to uphold 
my public duties as a citizen as a condition of preserving my freedom 
from arbitrary interference. Pettit, for example, makes this clear when 
he talks about the distinction between arbitrary and non-arbitrary 
interference. The imposition of taxes, for example, is in my interest 
even though I may well want to be an exception when it comes to 
actually paying them. 3l In this sense, the republican conception seeks 
to remove the sting from what for many is a fundamental paradox 
at the heart of 'positive liberty', namely, that one can be forced to be 
free. 32 For the republican, there are modes of interference that do not 
diminish freedom. 
But recall the earlier example of an arbitrary liberal government. 
What if there was an illiberal but rule-following government, one 
that heavily regulated our lives, but reasonably so (that is, in ways 
that really did advance our interests to varying extents), and in 
a clear and predictable way, including providing opportunities 
for us to argue for changes in the laws and rules etc. ?33 From the 
perspective of freedom, under which would you rather live: arbitrary 
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liberal government or illiberal but rule-following government? One 
promises less interference but unpredictability; the other predictClbility 
but more interference. At the very least, the thought experiment 
shows that both interference and domination have a role to play 
in evaluating how free people are. A critical question is identifying 
which forms of interference and which kinds of domination matter 
most, or are most important to prevent. The republican attempt to 
dissolve the unfreedom of interference per sc threatens to overlook 
one side of this analysis. 
This brings us to Michel Foucault. Foucault famously disconnected 
the analysis of power from any necessary relation to the intentional 
behaviour or attitudes of individuals, groups, systems or institutions. 
But he also sought to link the way people formed their beliefs and 
intentions to notions of normality and predictability derived from 
the human and behavioural sciences. If we want to say that freedom 
consists in the ability to act according to one's plans and intentions 
unconstrained by either domination or arbitrary interference, then 
Foucault offers another set of considerations about the range of 
constraints that are relevant, and the conceptions of self informing 
our analysis of those constraints. 
We are used to thinking of Foucault's engagement with political 
theory in terms of his analysis and critique of sovereignty and power. 
But his approach also has interesting consequences for an analysis 
of liberty. In a lecture at the College de France in 1976, Foucault 
summarized his approach in this way: 
To grasp the material agency of subjugation insofar as it constitutes subjects 
would, if you like, be to do precisely the opposite of what Hobbes was doing 
in the Leviathall. Ultimately I think that all jurists do the same thing, as their 
problem is to discover how a multiplicity of individuals and wills can be 
shaped into a single will or even a single body that is supposedly animated 
by a soul known as sovereignty .... Well, rather than raising this problem . 
. . . I think we should be trying ... to study the multiple peripheral bodies, 
the bodies that are constituted as subjects by power-effects.,4 
Foucault offers a distinctive analysis of the nature of free action, 
as well as the connection between liberty and coercion. One of his 
central claims is that freedom and power, broadly understood, are 
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conceptually and practically interdependent, not opposed. For him, 
modern subjectivity is always conceived of in terms of the effects 
of various relations of power, as opposed to being grounded in a 
foundational account of human flourishing. In Discipline and I'tllzislz 
and other writings, including the History (~f Sexuality, these relations 
of power - summarized as' discipline' and 'bio-power' - have bodies 
as their object, conceived not as inert matter but composed of various 
forces and capacities shaped by specific historical and institutional 
practices. 'Bio-power', of which the disciplines are a part, is focused 
especially on what he calls the 'species body' - on the regulation, 
shaping and disciplining of life itself. Discipline focuses on the 
discrete acts of bodies; bio-power refers to the shaping of the life of 
the body itself. 
An important historical development for Foucault, which he 
outlines in his lectures on the 'Birth of Biopolitics', is the emergence 
of a distinctive liberal 'art of government' or discipline, which 
he associates especially with the work of Adam Smith. Here the 
discovery and analysis of the 'natural system of liberty' - the 
apparently spontaneous mechanisms that underlie market relations 
- present another mode of government that works through a distinct 
knowledge of and respect for the 'circuits' of economic relations. 
Governments must ensure people are able to act freely in order 
to enable markets to work effectively. However, this respect for 
freedom is not based mainly on respect for individual rights. The 
limitation of governmental power is justified not by respect for 
individual freedom, but by 'the evidence of economic analysis 
which [governments] know has to be respected'.35 For Foucault, this 
is a crucial moment in the history of modern liberalism; it marks 
the beginning of an economic critique or limitation of sovereignty, 
especially as associated with the early modern 'police' state and 
raison d'etat. 36 
For reasons somewhat similar to those examined earlier (in 
discussing Taylor), Foucault does not think the emergence of 
the economic critique of sovereignty means we can say there is 
a quantitative increase in freedom from the eighteenth century 
onwards, just because the state begins to interfere less with individuals 
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and markets. Freedom is not a universal that is realized over time, 
Foucault claims. Rather, it is an 'actual relation between governors 
and governed, a relation in which the measure of the "too little" 
existing freedom is given by the" even more" freedom demanded'.37 
Liberal government is concerned not only with respecting freedom 
but 'consuming' it. It can only function if a number of freedoms 
actually exist: 
Liberalism formulates simply the fulluwing: I am going to produce what yuu 
need to be free. I am going to see to it that you are free to be free. And so, if 
this liberalism is not so much the imperative of freedom as the management 
and organization of the conditions in which one can be free, it is clear that the 
heart of this practice is an always different and mobile problematic relationship 
between the production of freedom and that which in the production of 
freedom risks limiting and destroying it.38 
In order to work properly, free markets need buyers as well as sellers; 
workers with the right set of skills and capacities; they also need 
the rule of law and legislative frameworks to protect against anti-
competitive practices and fraud. In short, there needs to be a whole 
range of governmental interventions and practices to secure the 
freedom required to sustain liberal societies. Individual interests have 
to be protected against the over-encroachment of certain collective 
interests (whether of the state, corporations or other powerful groups), 
and certain other collective interests (for example, public goods) 
have to be protected against potentially destructive conflict between 
unbridled individual interests. The freedom of economic processes 
must also not be allowed to undermine the health and well-being of 
individuals to such an extent that they are unable to act 'freely' in 
the manner required to sustain healthy economies. There is, in other 
words, a complex interplay between freedom and security at the 
heart of these emergent liberal arts of government. The' disciplines' 
- procedures of control, constraint and coercion - are extended 
alongside the emergence of new liberal freedoms. But along with 
these freedoms come new mechanisms, whose purpose is 'breathing 
life into, and increasing freedom, of introducing additional freedom 
through additional control and intervention'.39 
The key conceptual claim Foucault is making is that freedom and 
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discipline - and power more broadly - are not only non-contradictory, 
but mutually dependent. In one sense, freedom only really matters 
to us when constraints or obstacles are placed upon it (Foucault and 
Hobbes are in complete agreement here). This means that freedom 
can only ever be sustained (however we define it) if we are able to 
understand and act in such a way as to resist the forces seeking to 
constrain it. These capacities, of course, must come from somewhere 
and will involve some form of discipline or power, at the very least, 
over ourselves. Foucault has a distinctive account of this aspect of 
the relation between freedom and power. 
In his important late essay, 'The Subject and Power', Foucault 
made it explicit that what he was referring to here was the idea 
of power relations existing wherever there are 'actions upon the 
actions of others' ."u That is, he conceives of power relations as 
always presupposing agents capable of acting in various ways. We 
are both subject to relations of power (including those we impose 
on ourselves), and subjects with various capacities for action in 
response to those relations. Foucault thinks of human capacities as 
always developed in light of these relations of power, as he tries to 
demonstrate in his genealogies of human sexuality and disciplinary 
institutions. Our capacities for action, in other words, are partly a 
function of not only our physical constitution, but also the social 
and institutional context in which we live, including, crucially, 
those normative considerations (moral, political, ethical, cultural) 
one brings to bear on understanding and justifying one's actions to 
others."l Capacities can change, but also perspectives; sometimes 
the same capacities can acquire radical new meaning in the light of 
a changed or newly acquired perspectiveY The human sciences, for 
example, provide regulative models or ideals of 'normal' human 
flourishing that shape our practical reasoning in different ways. 
They also shape how the state and its agencies treat their citizens (as 
well as non-citizens). These discourses exercise a kind of epistemic 
authority in the public culture and in our own practical reasoning, 
but insofar as they come to shape implicit conceptions of the person 
and thus normatively available ideals of human flourishing, they 
come to shape moral attitudes as well. 
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As these relations of power and the forms of subjectivity they 
engender stabilize and become normalized, they act to constrain some 
range of actions (and thus persons) more than others, and identify 
some actors for particular forms of governance and interference rather 
than others. To the extent that this ends up severely constraining the 
capacities of particular individuals or groups to act on the actions of 
others acting on them, they congeal into relations of domination as 
opposed to relations of power. 
Foucault sometimes refers to the subject as forming itself through 
reflection and action, as when he suggests that thought is 'freedom in 
relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself 
from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem'Y 
In 'What is Enlightenment', he associates what he calls the' ethos of 
a permanent self-criticism' with work carried out 'by ourselves upon 
ourselves as free beings'.44 The suggestion is that to the extent that we 
actually have the capacities to act upon our own actions and react to 
those acting upon us, including gaining some reflective distance on 
those actions, we are free. 
But how are we to characterize this kind of freedom? For some, 
Foucault is caught in a contradiction between his commitment 
to genealogy and the positing of a kind of transcendental subject 
(especially given the emphasis on reflection and 'problematization' 
noted above}.45 But this is to presuppose exactly what Foucault sought 
to question in much of his work. Understanding the conditions of 
possibility for experience, including what it means to be free, can only 
be grasped in terms of what Foucault called the 'historical a priori'. 
According to this account, there is no contradiction between the 
idea of a self engaging in self-reflection and self-criticism on the one 
hand, and a genealogical account of the development of those very 
capacities in the context of 'power-knowledge' on the other. Freedom 
is a kind of ontological precondition for ethics and politics, but this is 
an historical as opposed to metaphysical ontology.46 I am free to the 
extent that I possess the actual capacities and self-understanding to 
(re-}act in a particular way to a particular set of relations of power, 
which presupposes agents who are capable of so acting. Hence what 
we might call Foucault's practice conception of liberty: 
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So there may ... always be a certain number of projects whose aim is to modify 
some constrilint~, to loosen, or even breilk them, but none of these projects 
can, simply by its nature, assure that people will have liberty automatically, 
that it will be established by the project itself. The liberty of men is never 
assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. 
This is why almost all these laws and institutions are quite capable of being 
turned around. Not because they are ambiguous, but simply because 'liberty' 
i~ what must be exercised.~7 
There are two interesting results to note here, returning to our 
comparison with the republican conception of freedom and that of 
Hobbes. First of all, as in the republican conception, interference per 
se doesn't constitute unfreedom, but in an even more radical sense, 
free agents are made, not given. Our capacity to practise freedom is 
contingent on a wide range of other practices, including practices of 
the self. Second, recall that on the republican conception I am unfree 
if I find myself in a situation in which someone or some agency could 
arbitrarily interfere with my liberty, even if they never actually intend 
to. The mere knowledge of my being in their debt renders me unfree. 
On Foucault's account, however, the fact that others could arbitrarily 
interfere with my freedom is a given feature of the social and political 
domain. It is inescapable, a permanent possibility of politics; part of 
the ontology of freedom. If Foucault's conception of freedom is not 
a liberal one, it is clearly not republican either. 
Thus, perhaps surprisingly, Foucault ends up endorsing something 
like a corporeal conception of liberty: I am free to the extent that I can 
actually exercise my capacities in such a way as to modify the actions 
of others on my actions. Freedom is tied very closely to action. But 
that corporeal freedom is itself conditioned by various social, political 
and historical forces, as well as the interpretive frameworks within 
which the agent understands himself. Thus Foucault's conception of 
corporeal freedom is far richer than Hobbes's, given his genealogical 
account of the nature of human bodies and their capacities. It is 
not merely a natural body seeking to maintain itself in motion and 
satisfy whatever desires it happens to possess. Instead, it includes 
a dynamic account of the capacities and perspectives that enable a 
particular kind of natural body to respond to and reflect on those 
actions acting on it, however much it is always acting within a dense 
25 
field of relations of power. 
Paul Patton has pointed out that to the extent that Foucault 
distinguishes between relations of domination and relations of 
power, subjects must be capable of experiencing something like the 
former as limits to their freedom of action in the first place.48 This is 
consistent with our initial claim that freedom only matters or comes 
to the fore in the context of forces seeking to constrain it in some way. 
This clearly presupposes agents who have available to them modes 
of self-interpretation (individually and collectively) that enable them 
to grasp their situation in this way. This is sometimes extended to 
an interpretation of Foucault's work on ethics and the modes of self-
fashioning found in various ancient Greek texts that he explores in the 
History of Sexuality. The suggestion is that, in these studies, Foucault 
was rediscovering a 'free subject' that discipline and bio-power had 
previously crowded out of his analysis. No doubt he changed his mind 
about many things. But the fundamental inter-relationship between 
power and agency, and especially the increasing intensification and 
efficiency of relations of power, remained central to his discussion 
of ethics as well. The kind of agency Foucault is interested in, both 
in his work on modern political thought and ancient ethics, is not 
causal- that is, the power to initiate action by an act of will in some 
way independent of antecedent causal conditions - but essentially 
historical. Moreover, he did not see it as his project to provide any 
universal criteria for what these critical modes of self-interpretation 
might be, or for their validity. Freedom, in the end, is what must be 
practised, and it will always be a function of the relations of power 
within which one is always enmeshed and against which one always 
reacts. Foucault's conception of freedom is a particularly radical 
version of what Ian Carter has called the 'specific freedom thesis'.49 
Individuals are not to be understood as free as such, or free in some 
non-specific sense, but free to do particular things and pursue 
particular ends. 
IV 
My story is almost at an end. If we are interested in a theory of political 
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liberty for our times, what should we be looking for? If freedom is 
a value constitutive of the identity of modern liberal democracies, 
then the legitimacy of the basic structure of that society will depend 
- in part - on the realization of freedom. As much as we can identify 
a primitive concept of liberty, it is too thin to serve these purposes. 
Any political order at all, and certainly one involving something 
like the state, will violate our primitive freedom. Moreover, freedom 
is always constrained, in some way, by different forms of internal 
and external determination, as we have seen. This need not entail 
that political liberty is a contradictory ideal, only that those forms 
of determination will have to be redeemed in light of the value of 
freedom as well. And this is precisely what we have been examining 
in our discussion of the distinction between negative and positive 
liberty, the republican freedom as non-domination and Foucault's 
practice conception of liberty. The differences between these 
conceptions are not best summarized in terms of negativity or 
positivity. They lie instead in the different accounts of the value of 
freedom, the relevant constraints on freedom and in their conceptions 
of the person and of human flourishing. 
What guidance do they provide for thinking about the urgent 
debate today over the balancing of our political liberties and the 
demands of security? First of all, one thing we must be careful about 
is the whole language of balancing in the first place.50 Balancing of 
what, exactly? If we think of our civil liberties as rights then there 
should already be constraints on the extent of any such balancing, 
given the way we usually think about the nature of rights in the first 
place. Even consequentialist justifications of rights acknowledge their 
special character in this sense. Also, we need to pay attention to the 
distributive effects of any such balancing. What might actually be 
occurring is that we are considering trading off the liberties of some 
people rather than those of all of us, and usually the civil liberties 
of a few for the security of the majority. And we need to ask hard 
questions about what difference any such trade-off might actually 
make in addressing the threats we face. Arguments for changing the 
priorities we assign to basic liberties require special scrutiny with 
regard to the consequences they purport to promote. 
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We also need to be wary of those who would argue there are 
not tough choices to be made, that because security is a necessary 
precondition for the enjoyment of our civil liberties, there is no inherent 
contradiction between security and freedom. There may not be a 
fundamental contradiction, but nor are they always easily reconciled. 
The best argument for restricting liberty in these circumstances is for 
the preservation of liberty itself, \vhether we understand liberty to be 
valuable as such or in terms of some scheme of specific liberties. But 
this means any proposal for restricting liberty will have to be judged 
against its consequences for the enjoyment of individual freedom 
overall, and I or in relation to the enjoyment of what we consider to 
be our most important liberties. Security is not intrinsically valuable; 
we value it for what it enables us to do or be. 
To keep sight of this tension we need to hold onto the notion of a 
cost in liberty, something I was pressing against the republican case. It 
is often tempting for liberals to say that if I have no right to do x then 
I have no claim in liberty to do x, and therefore if I am prevented 
from doing x I have no complaint in liberty against that constraint. 51 
Both Pettit and Skinner, albeit for slightly different reasons, make 
similar moves. I think this is mistaken, for reasons to do with the 
nature of freedom as a distinctly political value. 52 Political liberty 
is inevitably a moralized concept, albeit to different extents. But in 
any political community there will be deep disagreements about the 
judgments that go into evaluating which constraints matter most in 
relation to liberty, and which conceptions of the person (and their 
ends) are most desirable or valuable. Even if people understand they 
have no rightful claim to x, or that some forms of 'interference' are 
actually liberty-enhancing, they may still experience the constraint 
as restriction of their liberty and resent it. I might well think you are 
wrong to resent these particular constraints on your freedom, but this 
is different from saying you are being forced to be free. Democracy 
helps create the conditions for the possibility of collective action, but it 
also generates losers. The remainders of democratic loss - resentment, 
disappointment, rage - need always to be kept in view, lest they fester 
and undermine the sociability democracy requires to work. 
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